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Better short-seed quantum-proof extractors
Avraham Ben-Aroya∗ Amnon Ta-Shma†
Abstract
We construct a strong extractor against quantum storage that works for every min-entropy k, has
logarithmic seed length, and outputs Ω(k) bits, provided that the quantum adversary has at most βk
qubits of memory, for any β < 1
2
. The construction works by first condensing the source (with mini-
mal entropy-loss) and then applying an extractor that works well against quantum adversaries when the
source is close to uniform.
We also obtain an improved construction of a strong quantum-proof extractor in the high min-entropy
regime. Specifically, we construct an extractor that uses a logarithmic seed length and extracts Ω(n) bits
from any source over {0, 1}n, provided that the min-entropy of the source conditioned on the quantum
adversary’s state is at least (1− β)n, for any β < 1
2
.
1 Introduction
In the privacy amplification problem Alice and Bob share information that is only partially secret with re-
spect to an eavesdropper Charlie. Their goal is to distill this information to a shorter string that is completely
secret. The problem was introduced in [2, 1] for classical eavesdroppers. An interesting variant of the prob-
lem, where the eavesdropper is allowed to keep quantum information rather than just classical information,
was introduced by Ko¨nig, Maurer and Renner [15]. This situation naturally occurs in analyzing the security
of some quantum key-distribution protocols [4] and in bounded-storage cryptography [18, 16].
The shared information between Alice and Bob is modeled as a shared string x ∈ {0, 1}n, sampled
according a distribution X. The information of the eavesdropper is modeled as a mixed state, ρ(x), which
might correlated with x.
The privacy amplification problem can be solved by Alice and Bob, but only by using a (hopefully short)
random seed y, which can be public. Thus, Alice and Bob look for a function E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t →
{0, 1}m that acts on their shared input x and the public random string y, and extracts “true randomness”
for any “allowed” classical distribution X and side information ρ(X). More formally, E is an ǫ-strong
extractor for a family of inputs Ω, if for any distribution X and any quantum system ρ such that (X; ρ) ∈ Ω,
the distribution Y ◦E(X,Y )◦ρ is ǫ-close toU◦ρ, where U denotes the uniform distribution. (See Section 2.2
for precise details.)
Clearly, no randomness can be extracted if, for every x, it is possible to recover x from the side informa-
tion ρ(x). We say the conditional min-entropy of X with respect to ρ(X) is k, if an adversary holding the
state ρ(x) cannot guess the string x with probability higher than 2−k. Roughly speaking, if one can extract k
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no. of truly no. of classical quantum-proof
random bits output bits
O(n) m = k −O(1) Pair-wise independence, [14] X[15]
O(n− k + log n) m = n Fourier analysis, collision [7] X[10]
Θ(m) m = k −O(1) Almost pair-wise ind., [22, 12] X, [25]
O( log
2 n
log(k)) k
1−ζ Designs, [26] X, [6]
O(log n) m = Ω(n) [19, 3] X, This paper, provided k > (12 + ζ)n
log n+O(1) m = k −O(1) Lower bound [19, 20] X
Table 1: Explicit quantum-proof (n, k, ǫ) strong extractors. To simplify parameters, the error ǫ is a constant.
almost uniform bits from a source X in spite of the side information ρ(X), then the state X ◦ ρ(X) is close
to another state with conditional min-entropy at least k.1 Thus, in a very concrete sense, the ultimate goal
is finding extractors for sources with high conditional min-entropy.2 We say E is a quantum-proof (n, k, ǫ)
strong extractor if it extracts randomness from every input (X; ρ) with conditional min-entropy at least k.
Not every classical extractor3 is quantum-proof, as was shown by Gavinsky et al. [11]. On the positive
side, several well-known classical extractors are quantum-proof. Table 1 lists some of these constructions.
We remark that the best explicit classical extractors [13, 9, 8] achieve significantly better parameters than
those known to be quantum-proof.
A simpler adversarial model is the “bounded storage model” where the adversary may store a limited
number of qubits. The only advantage of the bounded storage model for extractors is that it simplifies the
proofs, and allows us to achieve results which currently we cannot prove in the general model. We say E is
an (n, k, b, ǫ) strong extractor against quantum storage if it extracts randomness from every pair (X; ρ) for
which X has at least k min-entropy and for every x, ρ(x) is a mixed state with at most b qubits.
In this paper we work with a slight generalization of the bounded storage model. We say E is a quantum-
proof (n, f, k, ǫ) strong extractor for flat distributions if it extracts randomness from every input (X; ρ) for
which X is a flat distribution (meaning it is uniform over its support) with exactly f min-entropy and the
conditional min-entropy is at least k. In Lemma 2.4 we prove the easy observation that any quantum-proof
(n, f, k, ǫ) strong extractor for flat distributions is also a (n, f, f − k, ǫ) strong extractor against quantum
storage.
We show a generic reduction from the problem of constructing quantum-proof (n, f, k, ǫ) strong extrac-
tors for flat distributions to the problem of constructing quantum-proof ((1 + α)f, f, k, ǫ) strong extractors
for flat distributions, and a similar reduction for the bounded storage model. In other words, in our model
the quantum adversary may have two types of information about the source: first, it may have some classical
knowledge about it, reflected in the fact that the input x is taken from some classical flat distribution X, and
second, it holds a quantum state that contains some information about the source. The reduction shows that
without loss of generality we may assume the classical input distribution is almost uniform. The reduction
uses a purely classical object called a strong lossless condenser and extends work done in [24] on extractors
to quantum-proof extractors. This reduction holds for any setting of the parameters.
We then augment this with a simple construction that shows how to obtain a quantum-proof ((1 +
α)f, f, k = (1−β)f, ǫ) strong extractor for flat distributions, provided that β < 12 . The argument here builds
1Such a source is said to have conditional smooth min-entropy k.
2A simple argument shows an extractor for sources with high conditional min-entropy is also an extractor for sources with high
conditional smooth min-entropy.
3We refer to extractors that extract randomness when the side information is classical as classical extractors.
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on work done in [19] on composition of extractors and extends it to quantum-proof extractors. Together,
these two reductions give:
Theorem 1.1. For any β < 12 and ǫ ≥ 2
−kβ
, there exists an explicit quantum-proof (n, k, (1 − β)k, ǫ)
strong extractor for flat sources E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m with seed length t = O(log n+ log ǫ−1)
and output length m = Ω(k).
Consequently,
Theorem 1.2. For any β < 12 and ǫ ≥ 2
−kβ
, there exists an explicit (n, k, βk, ǫ) strong extractor against
quantum storage, E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m, with seed length t = O(log n + log ǫ−1) and output
length m = Ω(k).
This gives the first logarithmic seed length extractor against b quantum storage that works for every
min-entropy k and extracts a constant fraction of the entropy, and it is applicable whenever b = βk for
β < 12 .
We would like to stress that in most practical applications, and in particular in cryptographic applications
such as quantum key distribution, it is generally impossible to bound the size of the side information. For
example, in quantum key distribution where extractors are used for privacy amplification, the conditional
min-entropy of the source can be estimated by measuring the noise on the channel, whereas any estimate on
the adversary’s memory is an unproven assumption. Thus, an extractor proven to work only against quantum
storage cannot be used in quantum key distribution protocols. We nevertheless feel that proving a result in
the bounded storage model may serve as a first step towards solving the general question.
In fact, the second component in the above construction also works in the general quantum-proof setting.
Specifically, this gives an extractor with seed length t = O(log n+log ǫ−1) that extracts Ω(n) bits from any
source with conditional min-entropy at least (1− β)n for β < 12 .
Theorem 1.3. For any β < 12 and ǫ ≥ 2
−nβ
, there exists an explicit quantum-proof (n, (1 − β)n, ǫ) strong
extractor E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m, with seed length t = O(log n + log ǫ−1) and output length
m = Ω(n).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains all the necessary preliminaries, including
the formal definitions of min-entropy, quantum-proof extractors and extractors against quantum storage. In
Section 3 we give the reduction which shows it is sufficient to construct extractors for sources with nearly
full min-entropy, when working in the bounded storage or flat sources settings. In Section 4 we describe the
construction of quantum-proof extractors when the conditional min-entropy is more than half, and give the
proof of Theorem 1.3. The proofs of Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 are given in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
Distributions. A distribution D on Λ is a function D : Λ → [0, 1] such that
∑
a∈ΛD(a) = 1. We
denote by x∼D sampling x according to the distribution D. Let Ut denote the uniform distribution over
{0, 1}t. We measure the distance between two distributions with the variational distance |D1 − D2|1 =
1
2
∑
a∈Λ |D1(a)−D2(a)|. The distributions D1 and D2 are ǫ-close if |D1 −D2|1 ≤ ǫ.
The min-entropy of D is denoted by H∞(D) and is defined to be
H∞(D) = min
a:D(a)>0
− log(D(a)).
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If H∞(D) ≥ k then for all a in the support of D it holds that D(a) ≤ 2−k. A distribution is flat if it is
uniformly distributed over its support. Every distribution D with H∞(D) ≥ k can be expressed as a convex
combination
∑
αiDi of flat distributions {Di}, each with min-entropy at least k. We sometimes abuse
notation and identify a set X with the flat distribution that is uniform over X.
If X is a distribution over Λ1 and f : Λ1 → Λ2 then f(X) denotes the distribution over Λ2 obtained
by sampling x from X and outputting f(x). If X1 and X2 are correlated distributions we denote their joint
distribution by X1 ◦X2. If X1 and X2 are independent distributions we replace ◦ by × and write X1 ×X2.
Mixed states. A pure state is a vector in some Hilbert space. A general quantum system is in a mixed state
— a probability distribution over pure states. Let {pi, |φi〉} denote the mixed state where the pure state |φi〉
occurs with probability pi. The behavior of the mixed state {pi, |φi〉} is completely characterized by its
density matrix ρ =
∑
i pi |φi〉〈φi|, in the sense that two mixed states with the same density matrix have the
same behavior under any physical operation. Notice that a density matrix over a Hilbert space H belongs
to Hom(H,H), the set of linear transformation from H to H. Density matrices are positive semi-definite
operators and have trace 1.
The trace distance between density matrices ρ1 and ρ2 is ‖ρ1 − ρ2‖tr = 12
∑
i |λi|, where {λi} are
the eigenvalues of ρ1 − ρ2. The trace distance coincides with the variational distance when ρ1 and ρ2 are
classical states (ρ is classical if it is diagonal in the standard basis). Similarly to probability distributions,
the density matrices ρ1 and ρ2 are ǫ-close if the trace distance between them is at most ǫ.
A positive operator valued measure (POVM) is the most general formulation of a measurement in quan-
tum computation. A POVM on a Hilbert space H is a collection {Fi} of positive semi-definite operators
Fi : Hom(H,H) → Hom(H,H) that sum-up to the identity transformation, i.e., Fi  0 and
∑
Fi = I .
Applying a POVM F = {Fi} on a density matrix ρ results in the distribution F (ρ) that outputs i with
probability Tr(Fiρ).
A Boolean measurement {F, I − F} ǫ-distinguishes ρ1 and ρ2 if |Tr(Fρ1)− Tr(Fρ2)| ≥ ǫ.
We shall need the following facts regarding the trace distance.
Fact 2.1. If ‖ρ1 − ρ2‖tr = δ then there exists a Boolean measurement that δ-distinguishes ρ1 and ρ2.
Fact 2.2. If ρ1 and ρ2 are ǫ-close then E(ρ1) and E(ρ2) are ǫ-close, for any physically realizable transfor-
mation E .
2.1 Min-entropy
To define the notion of quantum-proof extractors we first need the notion of quantum encoding of classical
states.
Definition 2.1. Let X be a distribution over some set Λ.
• An encoding of X is a collection ρ = {ρ(x)}x∈Λ of density matrices.
• An encoding ρ is a b-storage encoding if ρ(x) is a mixed state over b qubits, for all x ∈ Λ.
• An encoding is classical if ρ(x) is classical for all x.
The average encoding is denoted by ρ¯X = Ex∼X [ρ(x)].
Next we define the notion of conditional min-entropy. The conditional min-entropy of X given ρ(X)
measures the average success probability of predicting x given the encoding ρ(x). Formally,
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Definition 2.2. The conditional min-entropy of X given an encoding ρ is
H∞(X; ρ) = − log sup
F
E
x∼X
[Tr(Fxρ(x))],
where the supremum ranges over all POVMs F = {Fx}x∈Λ.
We remark that there exists another definition of conditional min-entropy in the quantum setting, which
is more algebraic in flavor. However, the two definitions are equivalent, as shown in [17].
Proposition 2.1 ([18, Proposition 2]). If ρ is a b-storage encoding of X then H∞(X; ρ) ≥ H∞(X) − b.
We shall need the following standard lemmas regarding min-entropy that can be found, e.g., in [21]. The
first lemma says that cutting ℓ bits from a source cannot reduce the min-entropy by more than ℓ.
Lemma 2.1. LetX = X1◦X2 be a distribution over bit strings and ρ be an encoding such thatH∞(X; ρ) ≥
k, and suppose that X2 is of length ℓ. Let ρ′ be the encoding of X1 defined by ρ′(x1) = Ex∼(X|X1=x1)[ρ(x)].
Then, H∞(X1; ρ′) ≥ k − l.
Proof: Given any predictor P ′ which predicts X1 from ρ′, we can construct a predictor P for X (from ρ)
as follows: P simply runs P ′ to obtain a prediction for the prefix x1, and then appends it with a randomly
chosen string from {0, 1}ℓ. Then,
Pr
x1◦x2∼X
[P (ρ(x1 ◦ x2)) = x1 ◦ x2] = Pr
x1◦x2∼X
[P ′(ρ(x1 ◦ x2)) = x1] · 2
−ℓ
= Pr
x1∼X1
[P ′(ρ′(x1)) = x1] · 2
−ℓ.
Thus, if H∞(X1; ρ′) < k − l then there would have been a predictor which predicts X with probability
greater than 2−k and this cannot be the case since H∞(X; ρ) ≥ k.
The second lemma says that if a source has high min-entropy, then revealing a short prefix (with high
probability) does not change much the min-entropy. The lemma is a generalization of a well known classical
lemma.
Lemma 2.2. LetX = X1◦X2 be a distribution and ρ be an encoding such thatH∞(X; ρ) ≥ k, and suppose
that X1 is of length ℓ. For a prefix x1, let ρx1 be the encoding of X2 defined by ρx1(x2) = ρ(x1 ◦ x2). Call
a prefix x1 bad if H∞(X2 | X1 = x1; ρx1) ≤ r and denote by B the set of bad prefixes. Then,
Pr[X1 ∈ B] ≤ 2
ℓ · 2r · 2−k.
Proof: Let the prefix x′1 ∈ B be the one with the largest probability mass. Then, Pr[X1 = x′1] ≥ Pr[X1 ∈
B] · 2−ℓ. For any z ∈ B, let Az denote the optimal predictor that predicts X2 from ρz , conditioned on
X1 = z. By the definition of min-entropy, for any z ∈ B,
E
x2∼(X2|X1=z)
Pr[Az(ρz(x2)) = x2] ≥ 2
−r.
In particular this holds for z = x′1.
Now, define a predictor P for X from ρ by
P (ρ(x)) = x′1 ◦ Ax′1(ρ(x)),
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that is, P simply “guesses” that the prefix is x′1 and then applies the optimal predictor Ax′1 . The average
success probability of P is
E
x∼X
[
Pr[P (ρ(x)) = x]
]
= E
x1∼X1
[
E
x2∼(X2|X1=x1)
[
δx1,x′1 · Pr[Ax′1(ρx′1(x2)) = x2]
]]
= Pr[X1 = x
′
1] · E
x2∼(X2|X1=x′1)
[
Pr[Ax′1(ρx′1(x2)) = x2]
]
≥ Pr[X1 ∈ B] · 2
−ℓ · 2−r
On the other hand, since H∞(X; ρ) ≥ k, the average success probability of P is at most 2−k. Altogether,
Pr[X1 ∈ B] ≤ 2
ℓ · 2r · 2−k.
2.2 Quantum-proof extractors
We now define the three different classes of extractors against quantum adversaries that we deal with in this
paper. We begin with the most general (and natural) definition:
Definition 2.3. A function E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m is a quantum-proof (n, k, ǫ) strong extractor if
for every distribution X over {0, 1}n and every encoding ρ such that H∞(X; ρ) ≥ k,
‖Ut ◦E(X,Ut) ◦ ρ(X)− Ut+m × ρ¯X‖tr ≤ ǫ.
We use ◦ to denote correlated values. Thus, Ut ◦ E(X,Ut) ◦ ρ(X) denotes the mixed state obtained by
sampling x∼X, y∼Ut and outputting |y,E(x, y)〉〈y,E(x, y)| ⊗ρ(x). Notice that all 3 registers are corre-
lated. When a register is independent of the others we use × instead of ◦. Thus, Ut+m × ρ¯X denotes the
mixed state obtained by sampling x∼X,w∼Ut+m and outputting |w〉〈w| ⊗ρ(x).
Next we define quantum-proof extractors for flat distributions:
Definition 2.4. A function E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m is a quantum-proof (n, f, k, ǫ) strong extrac-
tor for flat distributions if for every flat distribution X over {0, 1}n with exactly f min-entropy and every
encoding ρ of X with H∞(X; ρ) ≥ k,
‖Ut ◦E(X,Ut) ◦ ρ(X)− Ut+m × ρ¯X‖tr ≤ ǫ.
We remark that in the classical setting every extractor for flat distributions is also an extractor for general
distributions, since every distribution with min-entropy k can be expressed as a convex combination of flat
distributions over 2k elements.
Finally we define extractors against quantum storage:
Definition 2.5. A function E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m is an (n, k, b, ǫ) strong extractor against
quantum storage if for every distribution X over {0, 1}n with H∞(X) ≥ k and every b-storage encoding ρ
of X,
‖Ut ◦E(X,Ut) ◦ ρ(X)− Ut+m × ρ¯X‖tr ≤ ǫ.
The next lemma shows it sufficient to consider only flat distributions when arguing about the correctness
of extractors against quantum storage.
6
Lemma 2.3. If E is not an (n, k, b, ǫ) strong extractor against quantum storage then there exists a set X of
cardinality 2k and a b-storage encoding ρ such that E fails on (X; ρ), that is,
‖Ut ◦E(X,Ut) ◦ ρ(X)− Ut+m × ρ¯X‖tr > ǫ.
Proof: We prove the contrapositive, i.e., we assume that E works for flat distributions of min-entropy
exactly k and prove that it also works for general distributions with at least k min-entropy.
Suppose X is a distribution with H∞(X) ≥ k. Then X can expressed as a convex combination of
flat distributions Xi each with H∞(Xi) = k. If ρ is a b-storage encoding of X then it is also a b-storage
encoding of each of these flat distributions Xi. Thus, by assumption,
‖Ut ◦E(Xi, Ut) ◦ ρ(Xi)− Ut+m × ρ¯Xi‖tr ≤ ǫ.
Now by convexity,
‖Ut ◦E(X,Ut) ◦ ρ(X)− Ut+m × ρ¯X‖tr ≤ ǫ,
as desired.
Combining this with Proposition 2.1 we get:
Lemma 2.4. Every quantum-proof (n, f, k, ǫ) strong extractor for flat distributions, is an (n, f, f − k, ǫ)
strong extractor against quantum storage.
2.3 Lossless condensers
Definition 2.6 (strong condenser). A mapping C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}n′ is an (n, k1) →ǫ (n′, k2)
strong condenser if for every distribution X with k1 min-entropy, Ud ◦ C(X,Ud) is ǫ-close to a distribution
with d+ k2 min-entropy.
One typically wants to maximize k2 and bring it close to k1 while minimizing n′ (it can be as small as
k1 +O(log ǫ
−1)) and d (it can be as small as log((n− k)/(n′ − k)) + log ǫ−1 +O(1)). For a discussion of
the parameters, see [3, Appendix B]. We call the condenser lossless if k2 = k1.
The property of lossless condensers that we shall use is the following.
Fact 2.3 ([23, Lemma 2.2.1]). Let C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}n′ be an (n, k) →ǫ (n′, k) lossless
condenser. Consider the mapping
C ′ : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}n
′
× {0, 1}d
C ′(x, y) = C(x, y) ◦ y.
Then, for every set X ⊆ {0, 1}n of size |X| ≤ 2k, there exists a mapping C ′′ : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d →
{0, 1}n
′
× {0, 1}d that is injective on X × {0, 1}d and agrees with C ′ on at least 1 − ǫ fraction of the set
X × {0, 1}d.
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3 A reduction to full classical entropy
A popular approach for constructing explicit extractors in the classical setting is as follows:
• Construct an explicit extractor for the high min-entropy regime, i.e. for sources X distributed over
{0, 1}n that have k min-entropy for some large k close to n, and,
• Show a reduction from the general case to the high min-entropy case.
In the classical setting this is often achieved by composing an extractor for the high min-entropy regime
with a classical lossless condenser. Specifically, assume:
• C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}n
′
is an (n, k)→ǫ1 (n′, k) strong lossless condenser, and,
• E : {0, 1}d+n
′
× {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m is a (d+ n′, d+ k, ǫ2) strong extractor.
Define EC : {0, 1}n × ({0, 1}d × {0, 1}t)→ {0, 1}m by
EC(x, (y1, y2)) = E((C(x, y1), y1), y2).
In the classical setting, [24, Section 5] prove that EC is a strong (n, k, ǫ1 + ǫ2) extractor. In this section
we try to generalize this result to the quantum setting. We prove:
Theorem 3.1. Let C and EC be as above.
• If E is a quantum-proof (d + n′, d + k, k2, ǫ2) strong extractor for flat distributions, then EC is a
(n, k, k2, ǫ = ǫ2 + 2ǫ1) strong extractor for flat distributions.
• If E is a (d+n′, d+k, d+b, ǫ2) strong extractor against quantum storage, then EC is an (n, k, b, ǫ =
ǫ2 + 2ǫ1) strong extractor against quantum storage.
The intuition behind the theorem is the following. When the condenser C is applied on a flat source, it is
essentially a one-to-one mapping between the source X and its image C(X). Therefore, roughly speaking,
any quantum information about x can be translated to quantum information about C(x) and vice-versa. To
make this precise we need to take care of the condenser’s seed, and this incurs a small loss in the parameters.
We first prove the second item.
Proof (second item): Assume, by contradiction that EC is not an (n, k, b, ǫ = ǫ2 + 2ǫ1) strong extractor
against quantum storage. Then, by Lemma 2.3, there exists a subset X ⊆ {0, 1}n of cardinality 2k and a
b-storage encoding ρ of X such that, given this encoding, the output of the extractor EC is not ǫ-close to
uniform. That is,
‖Ut+d ◦EC(X,Ut+d) ◦ ρ(X) − Ut+d+m × ρ¯X‖tr > ǫ.
In particular, by Fact 2.1, there exists some Boolean measurement that ǫ-distinguishes the two distri-
butions. Since the first two components are classical, we can represent this measurement as follows. For
every y ∈ {0, 1}t+d and z ∈ {0, 1}m there exists a Boolean measurement {F y,z, I − F y,z} on the quantum
component such that ∣∣∣∣ E
x∼X, y∼U
[
Tr
(
F y,EC(x,y)ρ(x)
)]
− E
y,z∼U
[
Tr
(
F y,z ρ¯X
)]∣∣∣∣ > ǫ.
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We now show how this can be used to break the extractor E. Consider the set A = X × {0, 1}d. By
Fact 2.3, there exists a mapping D that is injective on A and agrees with the condenser on at least 1 − ǫ1
fraction of A. Denoting B = D(A), it is clear that H∞(B) ≥ d+ k.
For (x˜, y˜) ∈ B we define the encoding
ρ′(x˜, y˜) = |y1〉〈y1| ⊗ρ(D
←(x˜, y˜)),
where (x, y1) = D−1(x˜, y˜) ∈ A is the unique element such that D(x, y1) = (x˜, y˜), and D←(x˜, y˜) = x.
Next, we define a measurement
{
F
y2,z, I − F
y2,z} that given the input y2 ∈ {0, 1}t, z ∈ {0, 1}m and
ρ′(x˜, y˜) = |y1〉〈y1| ⊗ρ(x), sets y = (y1, y2) and applies the measurement {F y,z, I − F y,z} on the quantum
register ρ(x).
Now, ∣∣∣∣ E
b∼B, y2∼Ut
[
Tr
(
F
y2,E(b,y2)ρ′(b)
)]
− E
x∼X, y∼Ud+t
[
Tr
(
F y,EC(x,y)ρ(x)
)]∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ1,
since the flat distribution over B is ǫ1-close to the distribution obtained by sampling x ∈ X, y1 ∈ Ud and
outputting (C(x, y1), y1). For the same reason, averaging over B for F is almost as averaging over X for
F . Namely, ∣∣∣∣ E
y2,z∼U
[
Tr
(
F
y2,zρ¯′B
)]
− E
y,z∼U
[
Tr
(
F y,z ρ¯X
)]∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ1.
It follows that∣∣∣∣ E
b∼B, y2∼U
[
Tr
(
F
y2,E(b,y2)ρ′(b)
)]
− E
y2,z∼U
[
Tr
(
F
y2,zρ¯′B
)]∣∣∣∣ ≥∣∣∣∣ E
x∼X, y∼U
[
Tr
(
F y,EC(x,y)ρ(x)
)]
− E
y,z∼U
[
Tr
(
F y,z ρ¯X
)]∣∣∣∣− 2ǫ1 > ǫ− 2ǫ1 = ǫ2.
Clearly ρ′ is a (d+b)-storage encoding of B. This contradicts the fact that E is a strong extractor against
d+ b quantum storage.
We now prove the first item.
Proof (first item): Assume, for contradiction, that EC is not a quantum-proof (n, k, k2, ǫ) strong extractor
for flat distributions. Then there exists a subset X ⊆ {0, 1}n of cardinality exactly 2k and an encoding ρ
of X such that the conditional min-entropy is at least k2 but given this encoding the output of the extractor
EC is not ǫ-close to uniform. The proof proceeds as before, defining the Boolean measurement F , the sets
A and B, the encoding ρ′ and the measurement F . If we can show that H∞(B; ρ′) ≥ k2 then we break the
extractor E and reach a contradiction. Indeed:
Claim 3.1. H∞(B; ρ′) ≥ k2.
Proof: Assume, for contradiction, that H∞(B; ρ′) < k2. Then, there exists a predictor W ′ such that
Pr
b∼B
[W ′(ρ′(b)) = b] > 2−k2 .
Define a new predictor, W , that given ρ(x) works as follows. First W chooses y∼Ud and runs W ′ on
|y〉〈y| ⊗ρ(x) to get some answer b˜. It then outputs D←(˜b).
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The success probability of the predictor W is
Pr
x∼X
[W (ρ(x)) = x] = Pr
x∼X,y∈{0,1}d
[D←(W ′(|y〉〈y| ⊗ρ(x))) = x]
≥ Pr
x∼X,y∈{0,1}d
[W ′(|y〉〈y| ⊗ρ(x)) = D(x, y)]
= Pr
b∼B
[W ′(ρ′(b)) = b] > 2−k2 .
This contradicts the fact that H∞(X; ρ) ≥ k2.
We remark that we do not know how to extend the proof to work with lossy condensers.
4 An explicit quantum-proof extractor for the high-entropy regime
In this section we describe a construction of a short-seed quantum-proof (n, k, ǫ) strong extractor that works
whenever k ≫ n/2. In the classical setting this scenario was studied in [3], developing and improving
techniques from [19] and other papers. Here we only need the techniques developed in [19].
Intuitively, the extractor E that we construct works as follows. First, it divides the source to two parts of
equal length. Since the min-entropy is larger than n/2, for almost any fixing of the first part of the source,
the distribution on the second part has Ω(n) min-entropy. Hence, applying an extractor E2 on the second
part results in output bits that are close to uniform. Since this is true for almost every fixing of the first part,
these output bits are essentially independent of the first part of the source. Therefore, these output bits can
serve as a seed for another extractor, E1, that is applied on the first part of the source.
Formally, assume:
• E1 : {0, 1}
n/2 × {0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}m1 is a quantum-proof (n2 ,
n
2 − b, ǫ1) strong extractor, and,
• E2 : {0, 1}
n/2 × {0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}d1 is a quantum-proof (n2 , k, ǫ2) strong extractor.
Define E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}m1 by
E(x, y) = E1(x1, E2(x2, y)),
where x = x1 ◦ x2 and x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}n/2.
Theorem 4.1. Let E1, E2 and E be as above with k = n2 − b − log ǫ
−1
. Then E is a quantum-proof
(n, n− b, ǫ+ ǫ1 + ǫ2) strong extractor.
Proof: Let X = X1 ◦ X2 be a distribution on {0, 1}n = {0, 1}n/2 × {0, 1}n/2 and ρ be an encoding
such that H∞(X; ρ) ≥ n − b. For a prefix x1 ∈ {0, 1}n/2, let ρx1 be the encoding of X2 defined by
ρx1(x2) = ρ(x1 ◦ x2). A prefix x1 is said to be bad if H∞(X2 | X1 = x1; ρx1) ≤ k. By Lemma 2.2, the
probability x1 (sampled from X1) is bad is at most
2n/2 · 2k
2n−b
=
2n/2 · 2n/2−b−log ǫ
−1
2n−b
= ǫ.
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Whenever x1 is not bad, H∞(X2 | X1 = x1; ρx1) > k, that is, the extractor E2 is applied on a distribu-
tion with k min-entropy. Therefore, by the assumption on E2, its output is ǫ2-close to uniform. That is, for
every good x1,
‖Ud2 ◦ x1 ◦E2(X2, Ud2) ◦ ρx1(X2)− Ud2 ◦ x1 ◦ Ud1 ◦ ρx1(X2)‖tr ≤ ǫ2.
Hence, the distribution Ud2 ◦X1 ◦ E2(X2, Ud2) ◦ ρ(X) is (ǫ+ ǫ2)-close to Ud2 ◦X1 ◦ Ud1 ◦ ρ(X). In
particular,
‖Ud2 ◦E(X,Ud2) ◦ ρ(X) − Ud2+d1 ◦ ρ¯X‖tr
= ‖Ud2 ◦E1(X1, E2(X2, Ud2)) ◦ ρ(X) − Ud2+d1 ◦ ρ¯X‖tr
≤ ǫ+ ǫ2 + ‖Ud2 ◦ E1(X1, Ud1) ◦ ρ(X) − Ud2+d1 ◦ ρ¯X‖tr ,
where the last inequality follows from Fact 2.2.
Since, H∞(X; ρ) ≥ n−b, by Lemma 2.1, if we define an encoding ρ′ ofX1 by ρ′(x1) = Ex∼(X|X1=x1)[ρ(x)],
then H∞(X1; ρ′) ≥ n− b− n/2 = n/2− b. Therefore, by the assumption on E1 we get
‖E1(X1, Ud1) ◦ ρ(X)− Um1⊗ρ¯X‖tr ≤ ǫ1,
and thus
‖Ud2 ◦E(X,Ud2) ◦ ρ(X) − Ud2+d1⊗ρ¯X‖tr ≤ ǫ+ ǫ1 + ǫ2.
4.1 Plugging in explicit constructions
We use Trevisan’s extractor, which was already shown to be quantum-proof in [6, 5]. Specifically, we use
the following two instantiations of this extractor:
Theorem 4.2 ([5]). For every constant δ > 0, there existsE1 : {0, 1}
n
2×{0, 1}O(log
2(n/ǫ1)) → {0, 1}(1−δ)(
n
2
−b)
which is a quantum-proof (n2 , n2 − b, ǫ1) strong extractor.
Theorem 4.3 ([5]). For every constants γ1, γ2 > 0, there exists E2 : {0, 1}
n
2 × {0, 1}O(log(n/ǫ2)) →
{0, 1}k
1−γ1
which is a quantum-proof (n2 , k, ǫ2) strong extractor, for k > nγ2 .
Plugging these two constructions into Theorem 4.1 gives Theorem 1.3 which we now restate.
Theorem 1.3. For any β < 12 , γ > 0 and ǫ ≥ 2
−n(1−γ)/2
, there exists an explicit quantum-proof (n, (1 −
β)n, ǫ) strong extractor E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m, with seed length t = O(log n + log ǫ−1) and
output length m = Ω(n).
Proof: We set ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ, b = βn, k = n2 − βn − log ǫ
−1
, γ2 = δ =
1
2 and γ1 < γ. In order to apply
Theorem 4.1 we need to verify that the output length of E2 is not shorter than the seed length of E1. This is
indeed the case since
k1−γ1 ≥ (
n
2
− βn− n
1−γ
2 )1−γ1 ≥ n1−γ ≥ O(log2(
n
ǫ
)).
The output length of E is 12(
1
2 − β)n = Ω(n).
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5 The final extractor for the bounded storage model
We need the classical lossless condenser of [13].
Theorem 5.1 ([13]). For every α > 0 there exists an (n, k) →ǫ ((1 + α)k, k) strong lossless condenser C
with seed length O(log n+ log ǫ−1).
Plugging the condenser C and the extractor E of Theorem 1.3 into Theorem 3.1 gives Theorem 1.2,
which we now restate.
Theorem 1.2. For any β < 12 and ǫ ≥ 2
−kβ
, there exists an explicit (n, k, βk, ǫ) strong extractor against
quantum storage, E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m, with seed length t = O(log n + log ǫ−1) and output
length m = Ω(k).
Proof: Let ζ > 0 be a constant to be fixed later. The extractor E from Theorem 1.3, when the source length
is set to be 2(1−β)(1−ζ)k, is a quantum-proof
(
2(1−β)(1−ζ)k, (1−β)k, ǫ
)
strong extractor. In particular,
it is a
(
2(1− β)(1− ζ)k, k, βk, ǫ
)
strong extractor against quantum storage. Its output length is Ω(k). The
theorem follows by applying Theorem 3.1, using the condenser of Theorem 5.1 with α = 2(1−β)(1−ζ)−1.
Since β < 12 there is a way to fix ζ such that α > 0.
Since Theorem 3.1 works in the more general model of flat distributions, and since the extractor from
Theorem 1.3 already works in the most general setting, we get Theorem 1.1:
Theorem 1.1. For any β < 12 and ǫ ≥ 2
−kβ
, there exists an explicit quantum-proof (n, k, (1−β)k, ǫ) strong
extractor for flat distributions, E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m, with seed length t = O(log n + log ǫ−1)
and output length m = Ω(k).
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